

---

**Asset Identifier** PHAU91070101  
**Address** CHURCHYARD ROW 1, 3, 5 &  
7, APARTMENTS 1-115, CHURCHYARD  
ROW, BOROUGH & BANKSIDE  
**Post Code** SE11 4FB



**Code** FRA-PB  
**Version** 17  
**Description** FRA-PURPOSE BUILT BLOCKS

**Assessment Date** 12/02/2021  
**Assessment Version** Current  
**Assessor Name** Paul May

# 1 CONTENTS

## 1.1 Contents

---

1.1.1	Contents	-
1.1.2	Introduction	-
1.1.3	Summary	-
1.1.4	General Building Information	-
1.1.5	Maintenance Schedules	-
1.1.6	Fire Hazards and their Elimination and Control	-
1.1.7	Fire Protection Measures	-
1.1.8	Management of Fire Safety	-

## 2 INTRODUCTION

### 2.1 Introduction

---

#### 2.1.1 Introduction

This Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) has been carried out by a competent Fire Risk Assessor on behalf of the Responsible Person (Southwark Council) in accordance with Article 9 of the requirements of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (FSO). This report is an assessment of the risk to life from fire and does not address the risk to property or business continuity from fire.

In compliance with the scope of the FSO this FRA is limited to the common areas of the premises. The site survey undertaken to produce the assessment is limited to a TYPE 1 (non-destructive) survey of common areas only, in accordance with the Responsible Person's instructions.

However, where it is deemed relevant, a sample dwelling(s) will be inspected to determine its relationship and dependence on the common areas to understand the nature of fire separation between dwellings and common areas.

Further investigation may be required by qualified and competent individuals to ascertain the appropriate fitment and fire protection of encased shafts, ducts, risers or voids where a sampled non-destructive flat survey cannot confirm this.

In accordance with the limitations of the FSO risk assessment; this report does not include an assessment of external flame spread unless it is identified as impacting on the fire safety of common areas. However, the report may make reference to such issue and/or recommend further investigation and assessment if it has been identified as being relevant to the overall fire safety of the premises.

Where appropriate, the FRA will make recommendations to ensure compliance with relevant fire safety legislation. However, it should be understood that this assessment does not replace the Council's other obligations to carry out fire safety assessments such as those required by the Health and Housing Safety Rating System (HHSRS) assessment to dwellings under section 9 of the Housing Act 2004.

## 3 SUMMARY

### 3.1 Summary

3.1.1 Risk Rating

HIGH MODERATE

	LIKELIHOOD OF A FIRE				
CONSEQUENCE OF A FIRE	RARE	UNLIKELY	POSSIBLE	LIKELY	ALMOST CERTAIN
EXTREME	LOW MODERATE	HIGH MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SUBSTANTIAL	INTOLERABLE
MAJOR	TOLERABLE	LOW MODERATE	HIGH MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SUBSTANTIAL
MODERATE	TOLERABLE	TOLERABLE	LOW MODERATE	HIGH MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL
MINOR	TRIVIAL	TOLERABLE	TOLERABLE	LOW MODERATE	HIGH MODERATE
NEGLECTIBLE	TRIVIAL	TRIVIAL	TOLERABLE	TOLERABLE	LOW MODERATE

3.1.2 Next Physical Assessment Due

2022

3.1.3 FRA Type

PB

3.1.4 Storeys Ground and Above

8

3.1.5 Storeys Below Ground

1

3.1.6 Units

115

3.1.7 Status

COMPLETE

3.1.8 Building Dimensions. Length, width and height.

90m x 17m x 24m

The highest accessible floor level is at 15m. Beyond that height the storeys are within private duplex apartments.

3.1.9 List any tasks that once completed can reduce the risk rating of this assessment.

Executive Summary

Churchyard Row is a modern building forming a terrace of individual residential blocks of flats. The blocks are linked at the fifth floor level with the intention being to provide secure access at each block boundary maintaining security.

The fire risk assessment has noted a number of concerns that require action to be taken as detailed in the main FRA report. The primary issues are as follows;

- A lack of security between blocks along the fifth floor level.
- Inadequate and/or inappropriate fire stopping penetration sealing systems in the electrical risers in all blocks
- Universal faults showing on the indicator panels in blocks 7, 5 and 3.
- Potential for AOV/Mechanical ventilation not working as required in the relevant blocks.
- Some questions as to the timber lining in the cavities formed by the false ceilings in the corridors need to be addressed.

- The fire safety management of the terrace blocks may not be sufficient in recognising and reacting to issues related to the active and passive systems in place as part of the original fire strategy.

Further discussions relating to the building management (Terrace) may be prudent so a definitive approach to ensuring fire safety in the terrace is robust and appropriate at all times.

3.1.10 Does this assessment require a review?

Yes  No  N/A

## 4 GENERAL BUILDING INFORMATION

### 4.1 General Building Information

---

#### 4.1.1 Building information

This is a modern purpose built block built using CLT and composite design elements. The site consists of a terrace of four residential blocks of eight storeys (ground floor plus seven). The top most apartments are 'Duplex' which incorporate the sixth and seventh floors with the highest communal circulation area on the sixth floor.

This FRA will incorporate all four blocks of the terrace as a single FRA as opposed to previously where each core was subject to its own FRA. The blocks are almost identical in design and layout with minor variations which allow for a generic assessment of the internal aspect. The fifth floor is continuous throughout the terrace scheme prompting a single assessment of this horizontal escape route.

The site which Churchyard is part of consists of a 46 storey tower block with reception, theatre and commercial outlets. The Churchyard Row terrace is not part of the tower and is structurally separated apart from a basement car park and ancillary rooms such as cycle stores and refuse rooms usable by all occupants. There is an office for UNCLE staff and building managers to use within this basement storey that forms part of the terrace block. Additional offices and meeting rooms are located within the tower. These areas were inspected as part of the assessment but do not form part of the general means of escape for the occupants in the residential blocks.

The internal layout of the blocks is simple and each stair core (other than Block 1) has access to the basement via the escape stairway. A typical core will have a secure entrance giving access to an open ground floor area housing flats and service risers as well as the lifts to all floors. The associated stairway within each core has a final exit at ground floor level via a push bar door which allows individuals to escape directly to ultimate safety without having to re-enter the building.

#### 4.1.2 Any further building comments?

## 4 GENERAL BUILDING INFORMATION

This assessment is a type 1 survey and audits the common areas only. Southwark Council exceed this requirement and dwellings are sampled to take into account the validity of the internal means of escape, the fitting and working order of a fire alarm/detection system, any provisions for a second means of escape and any other fire safety issues noted.

Although no intrusive or destructive surveys were undertaken during this assessment any reports pertaining to internal vents and ducts where they report the need to undertake works involving fire stopping or dampers should be actioned.

As this property is designated general needs, it may be assumed that tenants are typical of the general population. It may also be assumed that any specific requirements as regard disability and evacuation of tenants are brought to the attention of Southwark council.

The scope of The Regulatory Reform ( Fire Safety ) Order 2005 is limited to the common parts of the building, therefore, areas within the dwellings, such as service ducts and ventilation facilities for kitchens and bathrooms, risers for electrical, water and heating services were not accessed at the time of this inspection.

It is therefore recommended that any future stock condition surveys or major works projects, take these areas into consideration and findings recorded and kept on file.

Owing to advice given by Government relating to the Coronavirus pandemic Southwark Council has implemented certain measures with regards to undertaking Fire Risk Assessments. This will limit the scope of the assessment to the communal areas of a residential block, and will not include any information on systems within individual residences to avoid increasing the exposure of the surveyors to the virus. Assumptions will not be made relating to the level of passive fire protection or automatic fire detection systems in dwellings, so any areas relating to these aspects that are deemed to be a concern but cannot be sufficiently determined at the time, should be highlighted as such to ensure they are assessed as soon as is practicable following a return to normal operations.

Flat entrance doors will only be subject to a visual inspection of the external face and frame and any concerns should be highlighted for later assessment.

# 5 MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES

## 5.1 Maintenance Schedules

---

### 5.1.1 Maintenance Schedules

No information re. testing and maintenance has been provided. The fire strategy for the blocks involves both passive and active fire safety measures. The active measures centres on AOVs and sprinklers within the flats. An understanding of the maintenance schedules for these elements is required.

# 6 FIRE HAZARDS AND THEIR ELIMINATION AND CONTROL

## 6.1 Electrical Sources of Ignition

- 6.1.1 Are there reasonable measures taken to prevent fires of electrical origin? Yes  No  N/A
- 6.1.2 Are fixed installations periodically tested and inspected? Yes  No  N/A
- 6.1.3 Is the fuseboard/mains intake suitably fire resistant? Yes  No  N/A
- 6.1.4 Comments

Southwark Council undertake 5 yearly inspections and testing of the landlord's electrical installation. Records of any testing or maintenance are held on the Council's internal database.

No portable appliances were observed in communal areas which would be subject to PAT testing. Portable electrical appliances are used in the common areas by councils own staff and approved contractors. The council has a system in place for testing its own portable appliances. Those appliances used by contractors are subject to the contractors own company's Health and Safety arrangements which are required by the council.

## 6.2 Gas

- 6.2.1 Is there gas supplied in the area of inspection? Yes  No  N/A
- 6.2.2 Is gas equipment protected/located so as to prevent accidental damage? Yes  No  N/A
- 6.2.3 Are gas installations and appliances free from any obvious defects? Yes  No  N/A
- 6.2.4 Comments

Gas has not been supplied to the building. No indication of a mains feed or associated pipe work was noted during the FRA.

## 6.3 Smoking

- 6.3.1 Is there evidence of smoking in areas where this has been prohibited? Yes  No  N/A
- 6.3.2 Comments

No evidence of smoking in the internal common areas was observed at the time of inspection. No smoking signs have been fitted in the access lobby to enforce the no smoking policy.

## 6.4 Arson

- 6.4.1 Does basic security against arson from outsiders appear to be reasonable? Yes  No  N/A



## 6 FIRE HAZARDS AND THEIR ELIMINATION AND CONTROL

The main access to each stair core is by secure entry fob and intercom system. The fifth floor is continuous between all four blocks with secure access doors between each separate core. During the FRA it was noted none of the doors that are required to be secure were so. This allows free movement through all four stair cores which is not ideal owing to the need to control unauthorised access to the common parts.

There is demonstrable evidence of ASB occurring in and around the blocks prompting a task action to be raised reflecting the need to manage this aspect of the blocks. Holistically, the need to ensure security is imperative, the task action will be 'HIGH' risk to reflect this.

6.4.2 Is there an unnecessary fire load within the building or in close proximity of the premises which is available to ignition from outsiders? Yes  No  N/A

6.4.3 Is there any shrubbery that needs pruning or removing to prevent fire spread if ignited? Yes  No  N/A

6.4.4 Comments

Control of the communal areas internally and externally is important to ensure the building's passive elements such as doors, walls and active systems such as the AOVs and manually operable call points are in working order.

For example; the need to also ensure signs that give direction to the flats (wayfinder) are in place and available for fire-fighter use in the event of an emergency is paramount.

### 6.5 Portable Heaters and Heating Installations

6.5.1 Does the area of inspection have any portable heaters or heating installations? Yes  No  N/A

### 6.6 Lightning

6.6.1 Does the premises have a lightning protection system? Yes  No  N/A

6.6.2 Comments

The LPS consists of air termination network and perimeter tapes at roof level.

### 6.7 Housekeeping

6.7.1 Is the standard of housekeeping adequate? Yes  No  N/A

6.7.2 Are combustible materials separated from any sources of ignition? Yes  No  N/A

6.7.3 Comments

## 6 FIRE HAZARDS AND THEIR ELIMINATION AND CONTROL

This premises has more than one direction of escape and protected communal escape routes which will allow a managed approach to housekeeping. There were no concerns noted in regard to items in the escape routes that have the potential to affect an evacuation or fire fighter intervention.

There is anecdotal evidence of excessive refuse being left in the communal areas of the building. At the time of the FRA there were no such items to report on. However, resident(s) experience must be taken into account and reacted to accordingly. Situations where excessive storage of domestic items or refuse is noted should be reported to the building manager immediately.

6.7.4 What is the housekeeping regime for the premises **MANAGED**

This is an acceptable regime for a building of this type. There are multiple exit routes at fifth floor level and single direction of travel below that in the blocks. Zero tolerance would be unrealistic and unreasonable in such a building. However, managed approach does require effective management to ensure the routes are kept safe.

### 6.8 Dangerous Substances

6.8.1 Are there any hazardous substances in the area of inspection? Yes  No  N/A

6.8.2 Are the general fire precautions adequate to address the hazards associated with dangerous substances used and stored on the premises? Yes  No  N/A

6.8.3 Comments

No dangerous/hazardous substances were noted during the FRA.

### 6.9 Hazards Introduced by Contractors or Works

6.9.1 Are there contractors or works taking place in the area of inspection? Yes  No  N/A

6.9.2 Is there satisfactory control over works carried out by the on site contractors (including hot works permits)? Yes  No  N/A

6.9.3 Comments

No hot works were being carried out at the time of the inspection with no evidence of any hot works having been carried out was observed.

Contractors carrying out work at Southwark Council premises are pre-selected from an approved list. They will have undergone a selection and training process prior to being allowed to carry out work at council premises. All contractors should receive a permit to work. There should be no reliance on council staff to perform safety checks on hot works carried out by contractor.

# 7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

## 7.1 Measures to Prevent Fire Spread and Development

7.1.1 Is compartmentation suitable? Yes  No  N/A

The blocks being assessed have been built to Approved Document B (B3) specification which details the fire performance criterion for escape routes in new buildings focusing on the prevention of internal fire spread. The fire strategy reflects the level of protection throughout the blocks.

However, as detailed in the last FRA there are missing structural elements between the ducting and lift shaft and the electrical intake service riser running the height of each core. The ducting itself has been routed from the basement and has been fire stopped at each point where it passes horizontally through a structural wall. There is little risk of fire spread from the basement to the riser(s) owing to this level of fire stopping and the lack of risk in those rooms/spaces.

There is however, the potential for an electrical fire involving armoured cables on trays and other installations within the risers on each floor to migrate to other floors via this route. The fire strategy drawings show a 60 minute wall was part of the design at all such points. In reality, the walls are missing in some areas.

The same riser voids throughout the blocks have incorrectly installed fire batts at the head of each intake. The Batt should have an ablative coat and have coat back to the cables. No buttering up of the batts has been undertaken prior to install leaving the elements loose and with large gaps. There is no mastic in place which is needed to complete the penetration sealing system and coat back.

7.1.2 Is there reasonable limitation of linings that might promote fire spread? Yes  No  N/A

An inspection of the cavity barriers within the circulation routes showed the soffit to be lined with timber planking. This is assumed to be part of the CLT construction. No mention of this construction material has been made in the strategy beyond the declaration of CLT being used to construct the blocks.

The ceiling inspection hatches outside each FED also shows the same timber plank design. The flats have a sprinkler system in place which reduces fire growth within the primary risk (flats). Fire stopping has been put in place above the cross corridor doors and above the FEDs where services have penetrated the separating structure between the flats and communal escape route(s).

The timber lining element may need to be confirmed as being an appropriate material for use in this area. There is no supporting evidence or fire test data for this aspect of the building construction. From a risk based approach within the scope of a type 1 FRA this does not pose a serious concern for the following reasons;

- sprinklered flats with reduced fire growth in the primary risk;
- Penetration sealing system applied where services enter the flats from the cavity barrier (not confirmed as appropriate fire stopping application as no evidence of the passive fire protection scope of works has been provided);
- fire sterile corridors;
- multi service cavity barriers are compartmented and separated from the other blocks by fire stopping. The sprinkler pipe work CPVC which offers is designed to have an acceptable level of reaction to fire to allow the water to continue to flow.

# 7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

## Images



IMG\_1388001.jpg



IMG\_1385001.jpg



IMG\_1386001.jpg



IMG\_1330.jpg

7.1.3 Where ducting is provided can it be ascertained if fire dampers are provided to prevent the spread of fire through compartments to protect the means of escape? Yes  No  N/A

The ductwork has been installed to include fire and smoke dampers in the following areas;

- Ducting serving both escape routes and accommodation;
- Ducting passing through both stairs, stair lobbies and accommodation;
- Ductwork passing through walls separating fire compartments.

Where the design allows the ductwork will be enclosed within fire resisting construction that leads directly to air therefore not requiring dampers to be included in the design. The dampers will close on activation of the building' smoke detection system.

## Images



IMG\_1290.jpg



IMG\_1291.jpg

7.1.4 Comments

## 7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

This is a modern residential building built using modern methods of construction with modern materials. The design is centred around ADB which is cited in the fire strategy.

A CLT and composite building provides a high level of compartmentation between the dwellings and communal areas/escape routes as is the intention at design stage. The materials used in the construction have a good level of fire resistance when installed correctly including controlling surface fire spread which is minimised throughout the escape routes.

The inspection found that penetration sealing systems (PSS) in the electrical service risers throughout the blocks has been incorrectly installed using inadequate material. The batt used should be ablative coated and installed with mastic including coat back to the services. There is no available information on the installation of passive of PSS and no indication of third party certification. It is important that this aspect of the building fire safety passive infrastructure is appropriate in material and installation. The evidence noted is to the contrary with no engineering report or manufacturer's evidence that deviation from standard installation practice can be allowed.

### 7.2 Means of Escape from Fire

7.2.1 Are there adequate provisions for exits in the area assessed? Yes  No  N/A

7.2.2 Are exits immediately openable where necessary? Yes  No  N/A

The final exit from the base of the escape stair in Block 3 is sticking to the point where it may prove to be problematic to open for some people. The door must be openable at all material times without the use of a key.

In Block 5 the original push bar opening mechanism is missing and in its place is a mock up push pad opener. This is not an acceptable mechanism for a door opener, this part of the final exit door furniture must be replaced with a bar as was the original design.

7.2.3 Are the means for securing the exit doors appropriate? Yes  No  N/A

In general the provision of door locks and associated emergency door release switches are suitable. However, as raised in the task action in Section 7.2.2 the final exit push is not opening easily and requires a replacement push bar opener to be re-instated to the door.

7.2.4 Is there suitable protection for the escape routes? This is to include any glazing. Yes  No  N/A

Two FEDs have been removed from the following flats; [REDACTED] in Block 5. The FEDs have been replaced with secure metal types as pictured. The new doors have large open gaps around the head of the leaf and frame and offer no passive protection to the escape route.

The flats are vacant but it must be assured that all services are isolated in both flats to reduce the risk of an electrical fault fire occurring and affecting the corridor. In addition, it may necessary to ensure the doors are flush to the frame to ensure lit material/accelerant can not be pushed through the gap. With the level of unsecured access and ASB there is a possibility of this occurring and it is therefore prudent to recognise the potential .

7.2.5 Are there any inner room scenarios? Yes  No  N/A

7.2.6 Are the escape routes free from obstructions or electrical/telecom installations likely to give rise to an obstruction in the event of a fire? Yes  No  N/A

7.2.7 Do any doors have additional security grilles or gates fitted over the means of escape that will hamper an individual in the event of a fire? Yes  No  N/A

## 7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

7.2.8 Where final exit doors are fitted with electrical overrides to open will this door open in the event of an electrical failure? Yes  No  N/A

7.2.9 Do the travel distances in the common areas comply with those escape distances specified in current/previous building regulations? Yes  No  N/A

7.2.10 Comments

This building has been specifically designed to incorporate protected routes from the FEDs to the final exit(s) using a mix of PFP and active systems as denoted in the fire strategy. The design incorporates lobby protection to the stairway in each block and cross corridor door sets to minimise smoke spread and isolate each storey exit as well as AOVs that form part of climate control to the internal aspects.

On floors 1 to 4 all flats are accessed directly off a lobby each served by an escape stair and lift. The lobby is provided with an AOV with dedicated smoke detectors and travel distance to the storey exit from the FEDs is minimal.

The escape stairway in all four stair cores give access directly to open air. In blocks 3, 5 and 7 there is a base of stair fire door that leads to the basement car park. This level is not on the general means of escape.

Although there are four stair cores with associated flats and ancillary rooms, the 5th level is continuous making the MOE generic on that level. This has prompted the FRA to incorporate all four blocks where previously a specific FRA was undertaken for each block.

The ancillary rooms in the basement have not been included in this Type 1 FRA as they are occasional use spaces for specific reasons and are well managed and fire sterile. In essence these spaces are entirely separate from the residential aspect.

There are refuges in the access lobbies to the relevant blocks that have access to the basement. The refuges are supplied with a PV, a fire curtain at the the lift door and comms point for the user. The area is supplied with emergency lighting and all doors are 60 minutes as is the separating structure between rooms/space.

### 7.3 Emergency Escape Lighting

7.3.1 Is Emergency Lighting provided and if so is there full compliance? Yes  No  N/A

Emergency lighting is in place throughout. The following task actions concern EL that has been damaged and may not therefore, work as required.

7.3.2 Comments

Emergency Lighting luminaries have been installed in all escape routes, areas immediately outside the building and in windowless areas such as the refuges. This has been installed in compliance with BS5266-1

### 7.4 Fire Safety Signs and Notices

7.4.1 Is there reasonable provision for all notices? Yes  No  N/A

7.4.2 Is there suitable signage for automatic, self closing and locked fire doors? Yes  No  N/A

## 7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

- 7.4.3 Is the fire action notice fitted in the correct area and displaying the correct information? Yes  No  N/A
- 7.4.4 Are the 'No Smoking' signs fitted and are there sufficient notices? Yes  No  N/A
- 7.4.5 Have 'areas of special risks' such as boiler rooms, oil transformer rooms, switchgear rooms and telecommunication rooms been appropriately signed? Yes  No  N/A
- 7.4.6 Comments

A suitable level of directional signage is in place to support an evacuation from the flats to the final exits. Firefighter way-finder signage is also in place clearly denoting the floor number and associated flats on that level.

### 7.5 Means of Giving Warning in Case of Fire

- 7.5.1 Does the common area of the building have an automatic detection and warning fire alarm system? Yes  No  N/A

A smoke detector in Block 5 near Flat [REDACTED] has been removed leaving only the base in place. This is required to operate the ventilation system and must be re-instated. The detector head has been placed in the riser next to the lift for safe keeping.

- 7.5.2 Is the extent of the detection fitted appropriate for the occupancy and fire risk? Yes  No  N/A
- 7.5.3 Is there the remote transmission of alarm signals to an Alarm Receiving Centre in place? Yes  No  N/A

The terraces each have a stand alone fire control point in the main reception foyer that includes a control and indicating panel. All CIPs are showing a fault and should be tested by a competent engineer to determine if they are working as required.

- 7.5.4 Comments

The fire strategy is quite clear in stating that the current system of BS5839-1: L5 is in place to actuate the AOV's only and is not a communal alarm system designed to initiate a full evacuation. There should be no manual call points within the terrace blocks as this would be in direct contradiction to the stay put strategy.

Level of AFD installed as per fire strategy -  
Duplex apartments; LD1  
Open plan apartment; LD1  
Flats with internal hallway (protected); LD3

The blocks have CIP in each entrance foyer as well as an AOV panel and refuge comms point. The CIP is showing fault in all cores and displays an issue occurring in the Tower which does not form part of the fabric of the terrace or share any part of the fire strategy. It is not understood why there should be a shared fault signal on all CIPs.

In addition, there are red MCP's at all storey and final exits throughout the terrace which are not required to be there. MCPs are designed to actuate the general alarm and initiate an evacuation if the automatic system has not detected a fire. In this case, there is no general alarm system to activate only a signal to be sent to the main panel in the tower reception.

## 7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

### Images



IMG\_1278.jpg

### 7.6 Smoke Ventilation Requirements

- 7.6.1 Is it considered that the premises has been provided with reasonable means of smoke ventilation in the event of a fire? Yes  No  N/A

The common areas of the terraces have 0.5m<sup>2</sup> area mechanical vents in place and a 1m<sup>2</sup> AOV at the head of each stairway. The mechanical ventilation extends into the basement refuges and shares the same smoke shaft.

The AOV control panels in each block foyer is showing a fault. This must be addressed as the mechanical/AOV systems form an intrinsic part of the fire strategy for the building.

- 7.6.2 Is the building ventilated naturally? Yes  No  N/A

- 7.6.3 If permanently ventilated in the common area is there sufficient free area? Yes  No  N/A

- 7.6.4 If permanently ventilated in the stair is there sufficient free area? Yes  No  N/A

- 7.6.5 Are vents/openings obstructed in any location where they are required? Yes  No  N/A

The vents themselves are not obstructed. However, the AOV override and reset switches designed for use by the fire service are obstructed by the opening of the door to the basement in the relevant blocks. When the access door to the basement is open the switches cannot be seen or accessed.

This issue was raised in the original FRA and is a legitimate concern relating to firefighter access and intervention. The switches are designed for use in the stair core and will be difficult to access when needed. The obvious solution will be to move all such switches to a more accessible and obvious place. Alternatively, the location of the AOV switches could be signed. This would not address the difficulty of accessing the switches however especially if the door is opened and is in use by firefighters.

As an interim measure, there should be signage denoting the location of the AOV switches whilst awaiting works. This could be a home made sign placed in the stair way.

- 7.6.6 Is the building ventilated naturally by AOV's, shutters or doors? Yes  No  N/A

- 7.6.7 Are detectors that operate AOV's, shutters and vents silent operating? Yes  No  N/A

- 7.6.8 Is the building ventilated by a mechanical smoke extraction system? Yes  No  N/A



## 7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

### 7.6.9 Comments

In each stairway associated with Blocks 7, 5 and 3 there is a 1m<sup>2</sup> AOV at the head of the core and mechanical vent in each residential lobby with a plan area of 0.5m<sup>2</sup>. Both elements of the smoke control strategy are actuated by the communal smoke detectors.

### 7.7 Fire Brigade Access and Facilities

- |       |   |   |  |                              |
|-------|---|---|--|------------------------------|
| 7.7.1 | Is there suitable access for fire appliances with adequate provision for a turning circle, hammerhead or other point a vehicle can turn if required?                                  | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/>            | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.2 | Are there any obstructions in the form of a gate, bollards or removable posts that may hinder appliance access?   | Yes <input type="checkbox"/>            | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.3 | Is the building fitted with either a wet or dry rising main?  | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/>            | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.4 | Is the hose distance to the riser or dwelling acceptable?   | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/>            | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.5 | Does the front entry door have a firefighter's override?  | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/>            | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.6 | Is the current access provision suitable and sufficient for firefighters? Is there an inappropriate level of security before entry is made into an affected dwelling by Firefighters? | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/>            | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.7 | Where locked do all firefighting facilities have FB locks?  | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/>            | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |

It was noted that in some of the stairways associated with Blocks 7, 5 and 3 there are portable fire extinguishers. The extinguishers are not required, not in test date and no persons in the premises are expected to be able to use them correctly. It is important that the extinguishers located in any of the blocks are removed. The appliances are not located on wall brackets or stands and may be used to hold open fire doors.

- |        |  |   |  |                              |
|--------|--|---|--|------------------------------|
| 7.7.8  | Are firefighting lifts installed?  | Yes <input type="checkbox"/>            | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.9  | Do the lifts in the area inspected have firefighting overrides?  | Yes <input type="checkbox"/>            | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.10 | Where fitted are all wet/dry riser outlets and inlets accessible?  | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/>            | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.11 | Is there suitable signage for firefighting facilities that would allow for effective use during firefighting operations?   | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/>            | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.12 | Where panels are fitted for smoke ventilation and fire alarm systems-have zonal charts been sited in a prominent position which have easy to follow instructions and are accurate? | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/>            | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |

The plans are located within the premises information box outside of each block entrance.

- |        |  |   |                             |                              |
|--------|--|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 7.7.13 | Does the building signage give correct directions to dwellings in an emergency?              | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.7.14 | Where fitted does the Premises Information Box contain the correct and relevant information? | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |

The PIB at each main entrance to the blocks contains an EDR (emergency door release) and plans of the associated block for firefighter use.

### 7.7.15 Comments

There are no concerns related to firefighter access in or around this building.

## 7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

### 7.8 Fire Doors

7.8.1 Are all dwelling front entry doors and hardware (where required) compliant with certification carried out to BS476-22/BSEN 1634-1 or of a suitable notional value? (Consider seals and strips) Yes  No  N/A

7.8.2 Are all cross corridor, stair and lobby doors certified to a test regime under BS476-22 or BS EN 1634-1 or of a suitable notional value? Yes  No  N/A

During the FRA it was noted that many of the fire door sets that form the passive protection for the horizontal escape routes on the fifth floor and the doors that open onto the stairway and Block 1 have broken or perished polymer blade smoke seals.

A fire door survey across all blocks (and where relevant) should be undertaken to check all such passive elements and to ensure they are in place and working as required. If this is not the case then they must be replaced with combined intumescent brush seals. The intention should be to replace all polymer blade seals with brush type seals over time.

7.8.3 Are all electrical intake/boiler/utility service room doors suitably fire resistant as tested under the BS476-22 or BS EN 1634-1 regime or of a suitable notional value? Yes  No  N/A

7.8.4 Are all ancillary doors (in escape routes) suitably fire resistant as tested against BS476-22/BS EN 1634-1 or of suitable notional value? Yes  No  N/A

7.8.5 Are all doors leading to rubbish areas or bin chutes where they are in the escape routes suitably tested to BS476-22/BS EN 1634-1 regime or of a suitable notional value? Yes  No  N/A

7.8.6 Do all fire doors have self closing devices compliant with BS EN 1154? Where not applicable are fire doors kept locked shut? Yes  No  N/A

The doors in the communal areas originally had cam action self closers in place. Since the previous FRA the cam action closers have been replaced with conventional top mounted self closers. All such closers were working as required during the FRA.

The sampled FEDs also showed top mounted self closers to be in place that are positive action units presumably to BSEN1154.

7.8.7 Are any fire doors surveyed at this site constructed of anything else other than wood? Yes  No  N/A

7.8.8 Do doors on the means of escape open in the direction of escape where necessary? Yes  No  N/A

7.8.9 Are doors on the means of escape fitted with appropriate panic bolts or latches where required? Yes  No  N/A

7.8.10 Where applicable are doors appropriate for use by disabled individuals? Yes  No  N/A

There were no such persons identified prior to or during the FRA.

7.8.11 Where applicable does the door have a vision panel fitted? Yes  No  N/A

7.8.12 Comments

## 7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

The fire door provision in the blocks has been design as part of ADB and forms part of the overall fire strategy for the terrace. The performance criterion for the fire doors is described in ADB and is as follows;

FED (flat entrance doors) - FD30S SC

Stair doors - FD30S SC

Riser doors - FD30

Lifts - FD30

Cross corridor door-sets - FD20S (will default to FD30 as FD20 is for internal dwellings)

Plant room doors - FD30

Store room doors - FD30

There is no requirement for smoke control elements to be fitted to the riser, plant or store room doors. However, permitter smoke seals have been fitted into the frames of the riser doors.

As stated, the polymer smoke seals to the fire doors along the communal escape routes are not fit for doors with high traffic as they break and/or perish very easily. There should be a programme of smoke seal replacement to all such doors starting with the broken/missing seals already evident.

The FRA also noted that the doors along the fifth floor continuous circulation route that links all four blocks are no longer secure allowing persons to freely access each block without the use of a fob. This has the potential for anti social behaviour to occur

Fire doors form an integral part of the passive protection to the building and support the proposed fire strategy. It is essential that the doors work as required which prompts regular visual assessments of the passive elements (intumescent smoke seals) and the self closers. A suitable management programme of the doors should be formulated and implemented.

### 7.9 External Wall Finish

- 7.9.1 Is this building over 18 metres in height? Yes  No  N/A
- 7.9.2 Does this building have an external cladding system which overlays the original structure? Yes  No  N/A
- 7.9.3 Does the building's exterior wall contain infill panels? Yes  No  N/A
- 7.9.4 Comments

The building has been designed to ADB and the fire strategy states the elevations have a surface finish that achieves Class 0 or B-s3-d2 in European standards. Without an destructive test or specific data relating to the material used it must be assumed this level of fire resistance has been achieved.

There were no areas of damage or missing wall details in proximity to the flats that may allow fire spread to occur.

# 8 MANAGEMENT OF FIRE SAFETY

## 8.1 Procedures and Arrangements

---

- 8.1.1 Are procedures in the event of fire appropriate and properly documented? Yes  No  N/A
- 8.1.2 Have staff and relevant individuals been given appropriate fire safety training? Yes  No  N/A
- 8.1.3 Are checks carried out by staff on fire safety systems where appropriate and logged? Yes  No  N/A
- 8.1.4 Are external stairs and in particular those devised as a means of escape regularly inspected, maintained and appropriate for use in all weathers? Yes  No  N/A
- 8.1.5 Comments

Management of fire safety in all areas other than the private dwellings falls under the remit of UNCLE. This means that testing and maintenance of the installed active and passive fire safety systems must be undertaken and recorded by the building management organisation. This information should also be available for inspection by the FRS and competent persons undertaking a fire risk assessment.

The FRA has highlighted that in many areas the communal areas are starting to show signs of wear and tear and malicious damage to fabric, doors and active systems such as emergency lighting and at least one smoke detector.

It is essential that the building, as a whole, is managed appropriately to ensure in the event of a fire the occupants can escape safely (or stay put) and that the FRS can manage fire-fighting operations efficiently.

The noted faults across all CIPs (control indicating panels), smoke control panels and refuge intercom phones in all building cores indicates the systems may not be available for operational use.

It is recommended that a structured approach to the management of the terraces is discussed, formulated and implemented with all stakeholder including LBS. There is a duty by the responsible person(s) to ensure communication and cooperation Article 22 of the Fire Safety Order) is observed and forms part of the overall management to the terrace blocks.

# Action Plan

## Issue No: 6.4.1.1

---

<b>Priority</b>	HIGH
<b>Location</b>	
<b>Floor</b>	
<b>Question</b>	Does basic security against arson from outsiders appear to be reasonable?
<b>Issue</b>	All internal fire doors on the fifth floor circulation route are unsecured.
<b>Action</b>	The doors must provide adequate security between cores to prevent ASB and general unauthorised access.
<b>Status</b>	Outstanding
<b>Target Date</b>	21/03/2021

## Issue No: 7.1.1.1

---

<b>Priority</b>	MEDIUM
<b>Location</b>	
<b>Floor</b>	
<b>Question</b>	Is compartmentation suitable?
<b>Issue</b>	Missing structural elements within the service risers close to the lift shaft. All cores.
<b>Action</b>	A suitably qualified engineer should be employed to address the missing walls within the lift shaft and to advise on remediation if this is found to be required. The fire strategy can be referenced to assist.
<b>Status</b>	Outstanding
<b>Target Date</b>	20/05/2021

### Images




(HSA)PHAU91070101-FRA-SITE-3-1-1-4-1-0-154.jpg

## Issue No: 7.1.1.2

---

<b>Priority</b>	HIGH
<b>Location</b>	
<b>Floor</b>	
<b>Question</b>	Is compartmentation suitable?
<b>Issue</b>	Inappropriate product and installation of penetration sealing system in the risers throughout the blocks.
<b>Action</b>	The PSS in higher risk areas must be assessed by a third party contractor and the appropriate level of remediation applied if deemed appropriate.
<b>Status</b>	Outstanding
<b>Target Date</b>	24/03/2021

## Images



IMG\_1272.jpg



IMG\_1273.jpg



IMG\_1349001.jpg



IMG\_1484.jpg

## Issue No: 7.2.2.1

---

<b>Priority</b>	HIGH
<b>Location</b>	
<b>Floor</b>	
<b>Question</b>	Are exits immediately openable where necessary?
<b>Issue</b>	Final exit from Block 3 not opening as required.
<b>Action</b>	Ensure the final exit door opens easily without the use of a key.
<b>Status</b>	Outstanding
<b>Target Date</b>	24/03/2021

## Issue No: 7.2.2.2

---

<b>Priority</b>	HIGH
<b>Location</b>	
<b>Floor</b>	
<b>Question</b>	Are exits immediately openable where necessary?
<b>Issue</b>	Final exit door from Block 5 missing push bar opening mechanism.
<b>Action</b>	replace existing mock up push pad with suitable push bar opening device as per original door design.
<b>Status</b>	Outstanding
<b>Target Date</b>	24/03/2021

## Images



IMG\_1303.jpg

### Issue No: 7.2.4.1

---

**Priority** HIGH  
**Location**  
**Floor**  
**Question** Is there suitable protection for the escape routes? This is to include any glazing.  
**Issue** Replacement FEDs to flats [REDACTED] with large open gaps around leaf and frame.  
**Action** Ensure/confirm that the electrical services to both flats [REDACTED] in Block 5 have been isolated.  
**Status** Outstanding  
**Target Date** 24/03/2021

**Images**



IMG\_1392001.jpg



IMG\_1394001.jpg

### Issue No: 7.3.1.1

---

**Priority** MEDIUM  
**Location**  
**Floor**  
**Question** Is Emergency Lighting provided and if so is there full compliance?  
**Issue** Emergency lights are broken/damaged in the entrance lobby to Block 5  
**Action** Replace and repair the EL as described.  
**Status** Outstanding  
**Target Date** 23/05/2021

**Images**



IMG\_1358001.jpg

### Issue No: 7.5.1.1

---

**Priority** HIGH  
**Location**  
**Floor**  
**Question** Does the common area of the building have an automatic detection and warning fire alarm system?  
**Issue** Missing smoke detector head outside flat [REDACTED]  
**Action** Reinstall the detector head on the base and ensure it is working as required. A suitably qualified engineer should be instructed to undertake this.  
**Status** Outstanding

**Target Date** 26/03/2021

**Images**



IMG\_1431.jpg



IMG\_1432.jpg

### Issue No: 7.5.3.1

**Priority** HIGH

**Location**

**Floor**

**Question** Is there the remote transmission of alarm signals to an Alarm Receiving Centre in place?

**Issue** The CIP in each terrace block is showing a fault.

**Action** Ensure all CIPs are working as required. A competent engineer should address this issue and ensure the CIPs are working as required.

**Status** Outstanding

**Target Date** 24/03/2021

**Images**



IMG\_1264.jpg

### Issue No: 7.6.1.1

**Priority** HIGH

**Location**

**Floor**

**Question** Is it considered that the premises has been provided with reasonable means of smoke ventilation in the event of a fire?

**Issue** AOV panel showing fault in all entrance foyers.

**Action** A competent engineer should test the system to determine if it is working as required.

**Status** Outstanding

**Target Date** 24/03/2021

**Images**



IMG\_1480001.jpg



### Issue No: 7.6.5.1

---

<b>Priority</b>	MEDIUM
<b>Location</b>	
<b>Floor</b>	
<b>Question</b>	Are vents/openings obstructed in any location where they are required?
<b>Issue</b>	AOV switches obstructed by basement door in each relevant block that has access to the basement.
<b>Action</b>	This switch should be moved to allow initial and continuous access for firefighters without the potential for obstruction by the door being open.
<b>Status</b>	Outstanding
<b>Target Date</b>	23/05/2021
<b>Images</b>	



IMG\_1283.jpg

### Issue No: 7.7.7.1

---

<b>Priority</b>	LOW
<b>Location</b>	
<b>Floor</b>	
<b>Question</b>	Where locked do all firefighting facilities have FB locks?
<b>Issue</b>	Fire extinguishers located on the landings of Blocks 7, 5 and 3.
<b>Action</b>	Where noted all such appliances should be removed from the communal areas.
<b>Status</b>	Outstanding
<b>Target Date</b>	24/02/2022

### Issue No: 7.8.2.1

---

<b>Priority</b>	MEDIUM
<b>Location</b>	
<b>Floor</b>	
<b>Question</b>	Are all cross corridor, stair and lobby doors certified to a test regime under BS476-22 or BS EN 1634-1 or of a suitable notional value?
<b>Issue</b>	All fire door sets on the escape route on the 5th floor and into Block 1 show signs of damage
<b>Action</b>	Where damaged the seals need to be replaced with combined intumescent smoke brush seals
<b>Status</b>	Outstanding
<b>Target Date</b>	23/05/2021

Images



IMG\_1282.jpg



IMG\_1460.jpg